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DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY IN CALIFORNIA IN
THE AFTERMATH OF JOHNSON v. STATE

INTRODUCTION

The concept of sovereign immunity dates back to the ancient
precept that "the king can do no wrong." Its introduction into
American law was perhaps inevitable in view of the common law
shared by both the British and American legal systems. But the
notion of the king's inability to err as a basis for a principle of
American jurisprudence is not without its ironic elements. One
author has commented:
It seems an anomaly that the theory "the King can do
no wrong" could become so entrenched in the laws of a
country founded on the precept that the King had indeed
done wrong. 1
The general term "sovereign immunity" has long embodied
the principle that actions performed by public officials pursuant
to a legislative grant of discretion should not be the subject of adjudication in the courts. On the other hand, the law traditionally
has allowed suits against public entities and their employees for
actions classified as "ministerial" rather than "discretionary" in nature. The distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts
has been codified in both the federal and California tort claim
acts2 and has in the past been a fruitful subject for law review
commentators. 3 One writer has described the discretionary immunity problem in this manner:
Somewhere a line supposedly separates the performance of
judicial, legislative, executive, and other "discretionary" functions from manual, clerical and other "ministerial" work.
The officer who exercises what the courts call discretionary
1. Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81 (1968), citing Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26
N.C.L. REV. 119 (1948).

2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346,
1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1970).
3. See, e.g., James, Tort Liability of Government Units and Their Officers,
22 U. CHi. L. REV. 610 (1955); Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed
Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207
(1956); Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking In A Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1963); Note, The Discretionary Immunity
Doctrine in California, 19 HAST. L.J. 561 (1968); Comment, California Tort
Claims Act: Discretionary Immunity, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 470 (1966).
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power is immune from tort liability, but the public
employee
whose tasks are regarded as ministerial is liable.4
In the 1969 landmark decision of Johnson v. State of Cali-

fornia,5 the California Supreme Court reviewed the concept of immunity for discretionary actions and recast the judicial test for applying such immunity in terms of the separation of powers doctrine. The Johnson case, which Professor Kenneth Davis applauds as one which "deserves to become the foundation for
further building of the law under the 'discretionary function' exception," 6 has thus attempted to simplify for the courts the difficult
problem of separating discretionary from ministerial acts.
This comment will discuss the holding of Johnson v. State
and examine the subsequent itreatment of discretionary immunity
in the California courts in light of that decision. So that the reader
may appreciate the significance of Johnson, the previous development of the discretionary immunity doctrine in California will be
briefly described. The discussion will center on the earlier landmark decision of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District,7 which ab-

rogated the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in California and led to the passage of the California Tort Claims Act.8
Secondly, Johnson v. State will be analyzed, with special attention
paid to three significant facets of its holding. Finally, the development of the case law in the aftermath of Johnson will be examined. For convenience, this analysis will focus on five areas:
(1) previous case law reconsidered in light of Johnson; (2) postJohnson liability; (3) the relationship between the discretionary
immunity statute' and the specific immunities in the California
Tort Claims Act;1" (4) the requirement that, to be allowed the
defense of discretionary immunity, the public entity or employee
first show that discretion was actually exercised; and (5) the suggestion that a discretionary act performed in a negligent manner
be subject to liability.
DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY BEFORE

1969

Early Development

A recent work on governmental immunity in California notes
that "[W]rongful acts or omissions involving official discretion
have long been held in California not a basis for personal liability
4. Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55

(1956).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

MICH.

L.

REV.

201, 206

69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08 at 846 (Supp. 1970).
55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966).
Id. § 820.2.
Id. §§ 810-996.6.
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of the culpable officer."'" The earliest case on the subject is
Downer v. Lent, 12 in which the plaintiff sued the Board of Pilot
Commissioners, which had forced him to surrender his pilot's license. The California Supreme Court held that the Board's
demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained, noting:
Whenever, from the necessity of the case, the law is obliged
to trust to the sound judgment -and discretion of an officer,
public policy demands that he should be protected from any
consequences of an erroneous judgment. 13
The problem which has plagued courts dealing with the discretionary immunity question, from the Downer decision to the
present, is how to determine which acts are discretionary and
therefore immune, and which are ministerial and therefore actionable. 4 A frequently cited case discussing this issue is Ham v.
County of Los Angeles," in which the court stated:

The main perplexity in the case of public officials...
is to determine where the ministerial and imperative duties
end and the discretionary powers begin. .

.

. [I]t would be

difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving
of a nail. 16
Four traditional approaches evolved by which the courts determined what acts were discretionary. Some courts used the
"dampen the ardor" approach as set forth by Justice Learned
Hand in the leading case of Gregoire v. Biddle.17 The theory behind this approach was that if immunity was not granted for certain
actions of public employees, those employees would be deterred
by fear of liability from making necessary governmental decisions.
The applicability of the immunity doctrine was determined by balancing the liability of the employee and the public entity against
"the effect that the liability would have upon the governmental
function being provided."' 18
The second method used by the courts, called the "semantic
approach," was an attempt to determine which acts were discre11. A. VAN

ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY §

1.14 at 15

(1964, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as VAN ALSTYNE].
12. 6 Cal. 94 (1856).
13. Id. at 95.
14. For a discussion of the development of the sovereign immunity doctrine
in California, see Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 5 CAL.
LAW

REVISION

COMM'N

REPORTS,

RECOMMENDATIONS

AND

STUDIES

248-53

[hereinafter cited as Sovereign Immunity Study].

15. 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 P. 462 (1920).
16. Id. at 162, 189 P. at 468.
17. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
18. Note, The Discretionary Immunity Doctrine in California, 19
561, 566 (1967-1968).

HAST. L.J.
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tionary and which were ministerial by mechanically applying a definition. For example, in Elder v. Anderson,'" the court of appeal
quoted the following definition of "discretionary acts" from a
Nevada case:
Discretionary acts are those wherein there is no 'hard and fast
rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not
is a clearly defined rule, such would elimtake, and, if there
20
inate discretion.
Unfortunately this approach did nothing more than restate the
problem.
Thirdly, some courts evolved what was called the "governmental action-proprietary action" distinction. 21 Under this standard, the government could not be liable for actions taken that were
peculiarly "governmental in nature, and thus could not be performed by private entities. 22
A fourth approach, developed by the United States Supreme
Court in Dalehite v. United States,2 3 attempted to make a distinction between the planning of governmental acts and the "operational" execution of the plans. In that case the court stated, "The
alleged 'negligence' does not subject the Government to liability.
The decisions held culpable were '24all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level."
The Muskopf and Lipman Decisions

In 1961, the California Supreme Court, following a trend evident from decisions in other state courts, 25 abrogated the doctrine

of sovereign immunity in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District,2 6

a case which Professor Davis calls "[p]ossibly the most important
state case

. . .

in the magnitude of its contribution to the move-

ment away from sovereign immunity. 2z7 In the companion case

of Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District,26 however, the

supreme court made it clear that, although sovereign immunity
was no longer a part of California common law, public entities still
not be held liable for discretionary actions of their employcould
29
ees.

19.
20.
21.
22.

205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1962).
Id. at 331, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 48, 51.
People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947).
Id. at 761-62, 178 P.2d at 5.

346 U.S. 15 (1953).
Id. at 42.
K. DAVIS, ADMINisTRATivE LAw TREATISE § 25.00 (1970 Supp.).
55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
27. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 469 (1972).
28. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
29. Id. at 229, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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In the aftermath of Muskopf and Lipman, the Legislature immediately passed Civil Code section 22.3,0 which delayed the abrogation of sovereign immunity until the ninety-first day after the
close of the 1963 legislative session. Then in 1963, after an extensive study of the sovereign immunity problem had been conducted by the California Law Revision Commission,3 the California Tort Claims Act 2 was enacted.
The CaliforniaTort Claims Act
The tort claims act retained part of the Muskopf and Lipman
rulings, while it rejected other facets of those holdings. Discretionary immunity for the acts of public entities and their employees gained express recognition:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee
is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission
where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of
the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion
be abused. 33
This codification of discretionary immunity, according to the Law
Revision Commission, 3 was
intended to be a restatement of pre4
existing California law.
To further ensure that what the courts presently viewed as
discretionary acts would not be construed differently by the judiciary in the future, the tort claims act went on to grant specific
immunities to certain kinds of administrative actions:
These specific provisions grant immunity to a public employee
for: non-negligent conduct in executing enactments; torts of
other persons not proximately caused by the employee; failure
to adopt or enforce an enactment; injuries caused by conduct
related to issuance, suspension, or revocation of licenses under
authority of an enactment; failure to make a health or safety
inspection; instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding; and entry upon property expressly or impliedly authorized by law. 35
At the same time, the Legislature rejected that part of the Lipman
holding which stated that the liability of the public entity and the
employee may not be co-extensive.30 Government Code section
30.
31.
32.
33.

Added by Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, § 1, at 3209 (expired Sept. 20, 1963).
Sovereign Immunity Study, supra note 14.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966).
Id. § 820.2.

34.

4 CAL. LAw REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUD-

843 (1963).
35. Note, California Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Immunity, 39 S. CAL.
L. REV. 470 (1966).
36. Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 229-30, 359
P.2d 465, 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961).
IES
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815.2 37 immunizes the public entity from liability where its employee is immune.
The period between 1963 and 1969 witnessed several developments which became part of the foundation for the decision in
Johnson v. State. The first was the formulation of the so-called
"subsequent negligence" rule. In the leading case of Sava v.
Fuller, 8 the court held that a state botanist had exercised discretion in making the decision to analyze a plant substance that a
child might have ingested, in order to determine whether or not
it was toxic. The botanist incorrectly diagnosed the substance as
toxic, and the child was thereafter treated for the ingestion of this
plant, rather than for his actual malady-bronchopneumonia.
The "subsequent negligence" of the botanist-occurring after he
had exercised his discretion-in making a faulty diagnosis of poisoning was held to be actionable."s
Other appellate courts disagreed with the subsequent negligence rule.

In Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles,4" police officers

had custody of 'two handcuffed persons. The suspects escaped
and, while fleeing, ran into and injured the plaintiff, who sucd
the officers for negligently failing to use sufficient force to restrain
the prisoners. The court stated that the subsequent negligence
doctrine had not been accepted by the Legislature, and held the
policemen immune. 4
Another approach adopted by some courts during this period
was the so-called "Good Samaritan" rule. Like the subsequent
negligence rule of Sava v. Fuller,42 the "Good Samaritan" rule
finds its origin in the federal courts.4 3 It holds that once a voluntary duty is assumed, negligent performance of that duty will be
actionable. It is simply an application of the traditional rule of
tort law that a party's nonfeasance may give rise to tort liability
where a person, in reasonable reliance on the party's promise of
aid, refrains from taking certain precautions or securing necessary
assistance and suffers harm as a result. 44 For example, in Morgan
v. County of Yuba,"4 a police officer gratuitously agreed to warn
the plaintiff's decedent when a certain prisoner was to be released,
and then failed to do so. The prisoner, upon release, sought out
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
38. 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967).

39. Id. at 290, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
40. 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965).
41. Id. at 138, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
42. 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967).

43. See, e.g., United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955).
44. United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1955).
45. 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964).

.
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and killed the unsuspecting promisee. The court held, in a
wrongful death action, that the officer was not immune. 46
While these approaches indicate that California courts were
developing increasing sophistication in dealing with the difficulties
of the discretionary immunity doctrine, there was still no consensus as to how these cases should be treated. In Johnson v.
State of California,47 the California Supreme Court approached
the concept of immunity from another perspective, viewing it as
an adjunct of the separation of powers doctrine.
JOHNSON V. STATE:

A NEW

APPROACH TO

DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY

Judicial opinions prior to Johnson only perfunctorily and

superficially discuss the purpose and rationale for granting immunity to governmental employees and entities for discretionary
actions. 48 The Johnson court emphasized that in dealing with this
question, the key word is "governmental": the purpose of the im-

munity is to protect "governmental" activities. 4" It held that immunity should be granted only for those basic policy decisions
which were distinctly delegated to the non-judicial branches of

government.5 0
Plaintiff Ida Mae Johnson and her husband were requested
by the Youth Authority to provide a foster home for a young juvenile. Five days after he was placed in the Johnson home, the
boy attacked the plaintiff with a butcher knife while she was
asleep."' Mrs. Johnson alleged that the Youth Authority had
failed to warn her and her husband of the boy's known homicidal
tendencies.
The issue, as framed by the court of appeal, was "whether
or not the negligent failure . . . to inform plaintiff of the boy's

tendencies comes within the immunity for discretionary acts or
omissions granted by section 820.2 of the Government Code."' 2
The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative,
holding that both the placement of the boy with the family and
the decision whether or not to warn were discretionary.53
46. Id. at 942-43, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12.
47. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).

48. Even Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967),
from which the supreme court draws heavily in its Johnson decision, does not discuss discretionary immunity in light of the purposes for the immunity.
49. 69 Cal. 2d at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
50. Id.

51. Johnson v. State of California, 65 Cal. Rptr. 717, 718, vacated, 69 Cal.
2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
52. Id. at 718-19.

53. Id. at 720.
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The supreme court, in reversing, rejected both the "semantic" and "dampen the ardor" approaches to discretionary immunity.54 Instead of applying these rationales, the court held that
certain policy factors are to be weighed in determining whether
immunity should be granted in a particular case.55 The supreme
court also examined the purpose of discretionary immunity and
concluded that its justification lay in the separation of powers doctrine.5" Finally, the court mandated that the state must initially
demonstrate that discretion
has in fact been exercised before immunity will attach. 5T
Rejection of EarlierApproaches

The court first held that "[a] semantic inquiry into the meaning of 'discretionary' will not suffice as a criterion for interpreting
section 820.2."' S Reviewing several of the definitions previously
applied in California cases, the court rejected "the state's invitation
to enmesh ourselves deeply in the semantic thicket."59 Lipman
v. Brisbane Elementary School District0 was cited for the proposi-

tion that such a purely mechanical approach to the discretionary
immunity doctrine would not suffice. 6'
Similarly, the "dampen the ardor" argument, which had been
advanced in previous California cases"' and which held that immunity is necessary to insure that an employee's zeal is not blunted
by fear of personal liability, was also rejected, but on different
grounds. The court recognized that this rationale at one time
might have been a valid basis for granting immunity, but that the
California system of indemnification, under which state employees
are reimbursed for monetary losses resulting from tort judgments
against them, substantially eliminated the concern that an employee's zeal might be dampened. 3 The court reached this conclusion after detailing the Government Code provisions protecting the
employee from monetary liability for actions taken in his government employ.64
Thus the court rejected two lines of California decisions dating back to the nineteenth century. In their place, the court
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

69 Cal. 2d at 787-93, 447 P.2d at 356-60, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 244-48.
Id. at 789, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
Id. at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
Id. at 794-95, n.8, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249, n.8.
Id. at 787, 447 P.2d at 356, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
Id. at 788, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245.

60.
61.
62.

55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
69 Cal. 2d at 789, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.

63. 69 Cal. 2d at 790-91, 447 P.2d at 358-59, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47.
64. CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 825-25.6 (West 1970).
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adopted an approach based on an even more venerated principle
of American law: separation of powers.
Approach Adopted
After first recognizing the difficulty of drawing a line "between the immune 'discretionary' decision and the unprotected
ministerial act" 5 the court noted that many governmental activities "'must remain beyond the range of judicial inquiry' . .
The court then stated:
centered their attention
Courts and commentators have
on an assurance of judicial abstention in areas in which responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to
coordinate branches of government. Any wider judicial review, we believe, would place the court in the unseemly posiexpressly ention of determining the propriety of decisions
7
trusted to a coordinate branch of government.
The court commented that this approach concentrates on the reasons for granting immunity to the governmental entity."8
The court then analyzed the specific problem raised by Mrs.
Johnson in the instant case. The decision to parole' the juvenile
was a resolution of policy consderations that was entrusted to the
Youth Authority, an agency in a coordinate branch of government.
The state was therefore immune from judicially decreed liability
on the decision to place the boy on parole. The failure to warn,
however, was a different matter. In dealing with this issue, the
court adopted the "subsequent negligence" approach utilized in
such California cases as Sava v. Fuller,69 and in a number of federal court decisions.70 Once the decision to parole had been
reached, subsequent actions carrying out that decision were not
immune:
Once an official reaches the decision to parole to a given
family, however, the determination as to whether to warn the
65. 62 Cal. 2d at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 794, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248. While the court noted
that its proposed distinction was sometimes described as that between the "planning" and "operational" levels of decision-making, the holding does not draw extensively from Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), the principal case
espousing this viewpoint. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra. Instead,
the Johnson reasoning more closely follows that of the subsequent negligence doctrine as it has developed in California. It should be noted, however, that the
"planning-operational level test" and the subsequent negligence approach have
much in common.
69. 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967).
70. See, e.g., American Exchange Bank of Madison, Wisconsin v. United
States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958); Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th
Cir. 1950).
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foster parents of latent dangers facing them presents no such
reasons for immunity; to the extent that a parole officer consciously considers pros and cons in deciding what information,
if any, should be given, he makes such a 71determination at
the lowest, ministerial rung of official action.
Policy Considerations
72
The Johnson court adverted to its earlier holding in Lipman
to reiterate the policies which are to be considered in determining
whether the discretionary immunity doctrine is to apply (that is,
whether the action sought to be challenged in litigation is committed to a coordinate branch of government). First of all, the
importance of the governmental function involved must be considered. Secondly, this function must be evaluated in light of the
extent to which imposed liability might impair its free exercise.
Finally, the court should consider the availability of remedies
other than a tort suit for damages. 73 These three policy considerations, an important part of the Johnson decision, have received
little attention in lower California courts.74
Requirement That Discretion in Fact Be Exercised
A potentially significant facet of the Johnson decision, which
is found in a footnote to the case, requires the governmental entity
or employee to demonstrate that a considered decision actually
took place. 75 If there was no such deliberation, the action is not
immune. In determining that the decision to parole was a policy
question entrusted to a coordinate branch of government, the court
stated: "This conclusion disposes of the question . . . whether
the governmental entity . . . must show that its employee actually

reached a considered decision knowingly and deliberately encountering the risks."' 76 The court continued:
Accordingly, to be entitled to immunity the state must make
a showing that such a policy decision, consciously balancing
risks and advantages, took place. The fact that an employee
normally engages in "discretionary activity" is irrelevant if, in
a given
case, the employee did not render a considered deci77
sion.
Since the state must affirmatively prove that discretion was exercised in fact, few cases can be disposed of on demurrer by the
governmental entity.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

69 Cal. 2d at 795-96, 447 P.2d at 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
See notes 118-123 and accompanying text infra.
69 Cal. 2d at 794 n.8, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.8.
Id.
Id. at 794-95 n.8, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.8.
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This requirement can be traced to a statutory origin. Section
820.2 of the Tort Claims Act states that before there can be immunity, the governmental act or omission must be "the result of the
exercise of the discretion."7 8 Thus the essential element of secconnection between the exercise of discretion 820.2 is "a causal
79
tion and the injury.
The Johnson court realistically noted that the approach it
adopted "offers some basic guideposts, although it certainly presents no panacea"" to the problem of discretionary immunity.
Nevertheless, it is a praiseworthy attempt to clarify one of the most
thoroughly confusing areas of California law. The Johnson decision, with its emphasis on immunity for activities of a governmental nature, can be viewed as an extension of the supreme court's
earlier holding in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District."' In that

case the court noted that "[iln formulating 'rules' and 'exceptions'
[as to immunity] . . . when there is negligence, the rule is lia-

bility, immunity is the exception."8 2 The Johnson rule, which
more closely approximates the liability of the governmental entity
for tortious conduct to that of the average person, is in keeping
with the court's position in Muskopf.
THE CURRENT POST-JOHNSON APPROACH IN CALIFORNIA

This review of the development of California law since Johnson v. State will highlight several facets of its holding. First, the
Johnson decision requires that case law before 1969 be reinterpreted in light of the separation of powers rationale. Although
the statutory basis for discretionary immunity remains unchanged,
pre-1969 holdings now must be analyzed carefully in light of Johnson to determine their continued validity as precedent. The application of the Johnson "subsequent negligence" rationale in the
area of correctional programs and police activities is particularly
difficult. Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles,83 a pre-Johnson decision, will be analyzed to demonstrate this difficulty.
Secondly, the California Supreme Court has clarified its
Johnson test for immunity in a number of subsequent decisions
which will be examined. The practicability of the Johnson test
for determining whether an act is discretionary will then be analyzed in light of the post-Johnson case history.
78. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).

79.
460, 74
80.
81.
82.
83.

McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 262, 449 P. 2d 453,
Cal. Rptr. 389, 396 (1969).
69 Cal. 2d at 794, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
Id. at 219, 359 P.2d at 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965).
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In County of Sacramento v. Superior Court,8 4 the supreme
court apparently settled the question of the relation of the general
discretionary immunity statute, section 820.2 of the Tort Claims
Act, to the other "specific" immunities found in the act which purport to codify traditionally discretionary governmental actions.
The County of Sacramento decision by a divided court, which held
that the specific immunities cover both the discretionary decision
and the ministerial implementation of that decision, will be examined in detail.
Fourthly, as noted earlier, the Johnson court requires the
governmental employee or entity to demonstrate that a considered
decision has actually been rendered before discretionary immunity
will apply. The subsequent treatment of this requirement by the
California courts will be discussed.
Finally, some commentators8 5 have suggested that the government should be held liable for its agents' decisions which,
though discretionary, are the product of a negligent exercise of
that discretion. While this suggestion has not been accepted by
the California legislature, the requirement in Johnson that discretion must actually be exercised before immunity will apply is a
step in this direction.
Previous Case Law in Light of Johnson
The Johnson approach, while fashioning a new lens through
which discretionary immunity is to be viewed, repudiated the reasoning, though not necessarily the result, of many previous California decisions."6 Professor Van Alstyne has noted that while
"the court did not expressly overrule any prior case . . . a number
of earlier opinions of the appellate courts are no longer authoritative. '8 7 The Johnson court rejected those opinions which applied the "dampen the ardor" and the "semantic" approaches to
discretionary immunity.8 8 It is also clear that the supreme court's
reliance on the subsequent negligence approach propounded in
Sava v. Fuller 9 renders doubtful the validity of decisions at odds
with this rationale. An examination of the continued validity of
the decision in Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles90 in light of Johnson is illustrative of the difficulties encountered in determining
whether pre-Johnson cases are still good law.
84. 8 Cal. 3d 479, 503 P.2d 1382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1972).
85. See notes 190-91 and accompanying text infra.

86. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 11, § 5.54, at 18-19.
87. Id. § 5.51, at 14-15.
88. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.

89. 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967).
accompanying text supra.

90. 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965).

See note 38-39 and
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Ne Casek held that policemen who had negligently allowed
prisoners to escape and injure a bystander by colliding into her
were immune in a tort action for negligence. The policemen's
decision as to the amount of force to be used in detaining the suspects was found by the court to be discretionary"1
The supreme court in Johnson ratified the Ne Casek reasoning which rejected the "semantic" approach to discretionary immunity.2 However, Johnson did not follow that part of Ne Casekin which the court declined to draw the "subtle distinction," required by the subsequent negligence doctrine, between a deliberate decision on the part of the officers to use a particular means
of physical restraint, and the negligent application of that decision."' In addition, Johnson cited Ne Casek for the proposition
that the "dampen the ardor" justification for immunity is no longer
viable.9" The Ne Casek court reached exactly the opposite conclusion, however, stating:
It therefore appears to us that if . . . it is the possible
dampening of a public official's zeal which is the basis for the
discretionary immunity doctrine, its application
seems particu5
larly appropriate in the present context.
Applying the "subsequent negligence" doctrine approved in
Johnson to the Ne Casek fact situation would seem to require a
different result in the latter case: the discretionary act in Ne
Casek was the decision to use certain means of restraint; the "ministerial" implementation of the decision, including the officers'
negligence in allowing the prisoners to escape, would be actionable. However, the subsequent negligence doctrine is not easily
adapted to situations involving the arrest, incarceration, or release
of prisoners. For example, as the court observed in Ne Casek,
to have held the officers liable would have been tantamount to
inviting increased use of force against arrestees in the future, and
the formulation of "[a] rule of law which may encourage police
brutality is not desirable." 96
The court of appeal in State v. Superior Court for the County

of Orange7 enunciated another policy factor militating against the
use of the subsequent negligence doctrine in this situation.
For purposes of imposing tort liability, courts of this state
have been quite hesitant to view as ministerial particular decisions or acts involving prisoner rehabilitation. [citations
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 142, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
69 Cal. 2d at 790, 447 P.2d at 358, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
233 Cal. App. 2d at 137-38, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
69 Cal. 2d at 790-91, 447 P.2d at 358, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
233 Cal. App. 2d at 137, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
Id., 43 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
37 Cal. App. 3d 1025, 112 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1974).
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omitted].... This hesitancy to classify decisions or acts
as ministerial-i.e., liability inducing-derives from a policy
judgment that prison personnel might otherwise be inhibited
from maintaining innovative rehabilitation-release programs. 98
In a subsequent decision, County of Sacramento v. Superior

Court,9 the California Supreme Court specifically approved the
holding in Ne Casek,100 thus creating an exception to the subsequent negligence formulation approved in Johnson.
Ne Casek points up the difficulty in determining the validity
of pre-1969 cases in light of Johnson. Pre-Johnson cases must
be analyzed carefully; in some instances the holding of the case
will remain the same, while the reasons for the decision will no
longer be valid. In some areas, such as the administration of correctional programs, other policy factors may lead to the conclusion
that the "subsequent negligence" approach, endorsed in Johnson,
should not be applied. In addition, as might be expected in this
difficult area, the test is more easily applied in some factual situations than in others. The supreme court itself has taken the opportunity to apply directly its Johnson test in two cases' 01 since
Johnson was handed down, thus affording the lower courts some
additional guidance in the area.
Post-JohnsonLiability

Shortly after its decision in Johnson, the California Supreme

Court decided the case of McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles."0 2

The court had granted a hearing in the case prior to rendering
the Johnson decision; thus in McCorkle, it adopted substantially
the decision of the court of appeal, noting that the appellate court
opinion was correct in light of Johnson.10 3 The reasoning in McCorkle is fully in accord with the "subsequent negligence" rationale of Sava v. Fuller,04 which was endorsed in Johnson. Once
the discretionary decision entrusted to a coordinate branch of government was made, the "subsequent negligence" of the governmental employee in carrying out that decision was no longer immune.
In McCorkle, the defendant policeman was in the process of
98. Id. at 1026, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
99. 8 Cal. 3d 479, 503 P.2d 1382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1972).
100. Id. at 485, 503 P.2d at 1386-87, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
101. Ramos v. County of Madera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr.
421 (1971); McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453,
74 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1969).
102. 70 Cal. 2d 252, 449 P.2d 453, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1969).
103. Id. at 254-55, 449 P.2d at 455, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
104. 249 Cal. App. 2d 281,57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967).
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investigating a traffic accident, when he directed the plaintiff, who
had been involved in the accident, to go out into the street and
demonstrate what had occurred. Complying with the officer's direction, the plaintiff was run down by another car and subsequently sued the police and the city for negligence.1" 5 Because
the officer had already exercised his discretion in deciding to investigate the accident, his discretionary immunity was held not to
apply to the subsequent "ministerial" actions taken in carrying out
that decision. 10
The case emphasizes the essential requirement of Government Code section 820.21° 7-that a causal connection must exist
between the exercise of discretion and the injury before there can
be immunity. In McCorkle, no causal connection was found.
The court said:
[The officer] would have been immune if plaintiff's injury had
been the result of [the officer's] exercise of discretion ...
It was not: it resulted from0 8his negligence after the discretion,
if any, had been exercised.
McCorkle also illustrates the limited notion of "discretion"
applied in the Johnson case. Decisions which are of a purely governmental nature and which are clearly to be decided by a nonjudicial branch of government will be immune. Actions by government employees carrying out those basic policy decisions, although they may involve the use of "discretion" in the ordinary
sense of the word, will not be immune.' 0
The officer's actions at the scene of the accident certainly involved elements of "discretion" as the word is commonly used:
he had to decide, for example, whether to call a towing truck,
whether back-up police should be called in, and what would be
the quickest and safest way to clear up the accident. But, although these decisions involved discretion to the extent that the
officer had to choose among alternative courses of action, they
were not considered "governmental" decisions and therefore immunity did not attach." 0 Instead the officer was held to the
normal standard of care in tort law-that of the reasonable man
under similar circumstances.
Ramos v. County of Madera"' provides another example of
105. 70 Cal. 2d at 258-60, 449 P.2d at 458-59, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95.
106. Id. at 261-62, 449 P.2d at 460, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
107. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
108. 70 Cal. 2d at 261-62, 449 P.2d at 460, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
109. "The court said: "[T]he existence of some such alternatives facing the employee does not perforce lead to a holding that the governmental unit
thereby attains the status of non-liability under section 820.2." 69 Cal. 2d at 790,
447 P.2d at 358, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
110. 70 Cal. 2d at 261-62, 449 P.2d at 460, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
111. 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
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the supreme court's application of its Johnson test. Plaintiffs, two
families receiving state aid, alleged in their complaint that the
county welfare department had ordered the adults and minor children to work in the fields or have their payments cut off. The
Segovia family sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress
upon their fifteen-year old mentally-reatrded daughter, who had
been verbally assaulted by a county social worker for failing to
work. The Valero family alleged that, as a result of working in
the field, two of their children had become physically ill. Both
families sought damages from the county for tortiously coercing
the plaintiffs to work as a condition to receiving welfare payments,
11 2
contrary to state law.
The defendants claimed discretionary immunity for the actions taken at the county level. After re-iterating its premise, propounded in the Muskopf and Johnson cases, that compensation
must be afforded to injured parties, unless immunity is clearly provided for by statute,"' the California Supreme Court rejected the
argument. The court held that the basic policy decisionwhether or not able-bodied minors must be unemployed but willing to work as a condition to receiving state aid-was made by
the Legislature." 4 Said the court: "The authority given to
counties to implement the basic policy decisions of the Legislature
is purely ministerial.""' 5
One 1969 case provides an excellent example of the type of
governmental decision which the Johnson court determined was
"committed" to a coordinate branch of government and thus immune from liability. In Susman v. City of Los Angeles," 6 plaintiffs sued the city and state, alleging in one count that the National
Guard should have been called in to combat a riot. The court
analyzed the nature of the governmental decision to be made and
concluded that it was peculiarly in the province of the executive
branch of government:
The reasoning of Johnson is . . . particularly applicable
to the allegations with respect to the acting Governor upon
which plaintiffs seek to base a cause of action in tort against
the State of California. When and under what circumstances
the National Guard should be called into action to preserve
the peace and to protect property is a matter within the discretion of the Governor . . .and, for the reasons expressed
in Johnson. . .is not open to judicial inquiry or review. 1 7
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 689-90, 484 P.2d at 95-96, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
Id. at 692, 484 P.2d at 98, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
Id. at 693-94, 484 P.2d at 99-100, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 427-28.
Id. at 695, 484 P.2d at 100, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
Id. at 818-19, 75 CaL Rptr. at 250.
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Practicabilityof the Johnson "Policy Factors"
The Johnson case mandated that discretionary immunity apply only to those governmental decisions which are to be made
by a coordinate branch of government. The case also laid out
a test by which courts were to determine which governmental actions were discretionary under the terms of the statute:
Although it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule
which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable for discretionary acts of its officials,
various factors furnish a means of deciding whether the
agency in a particular case should have immunity, such as the
importance to the public of the function involved, the extent
to which governmental liability might impair free exercise of
the function, and the availability to individuals affected of
remedies other than tort suits for damages. 118
These three policy factors have not been widely used in the analysis, apparently called for in Johnson, to determine whether the action is committed to a coordinate branch of government.
For example, in Jones v. Oxnard School District,"" the court
of appeal merely noted that " '[d]iscretionary' is . . . to be given
a flexible definition which balances the harm that may be caused
by inhibition upon the governmental function against the desirabilo In another decision,
ity of providing redress for wrong . ..
Burns v. City Council of Folsom, 2 ' the court chose to emphasize
the third factor: availability of other remedies. In reaching its
decision that a building inspector, having no mandatory duty to
issue a building permit, was immune from civil liability, the court
held that the plaintiff had been wholly preoccupied with monetary
122
relief and had failed to pursue his administrative remedies.
The court found that, in light of the Johnson policy factor of encouraging the use of alternative remedies, the plaintiff's failure
was fatal to his cause of action.' " '
The application of these three policies, which the Johnson
court cited as ". . . 'furnish[ing] a means of deciding whether the
the agency in a particular case should have immunity . . .' I
118. 69 Cal. 2d at 789, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245, quoting Lipman
v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 359 P.2d 465, 467, 11
Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961).
119. 270 Cal. App. 2d 587, 75 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1969).
120. Id. at 593, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
121. 31 Cal. App. 3d 999, 107 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1973).
122. Id. at 1005, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
123. Id. While the court was actually construing sections 818.4 and 821.2 of
the Tort Claims Act, it felt that the policy factors enunciated in the Johnson
court's interpretation of section 820.2 were applicable to these sections as well.
Id. at 1004, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 790-91.
124. 69 Cal. 2d at 789, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245, quoting Lipman
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remains unclear. The California Supreme Court has not expanded upon them at any length. At this point in the development of the discretionary immunity doctrine in California, however, several comments can be made concerning their practicability.
Certainly, the more important the governmental decision is
to the public, the more likely that it will be a basic policy decision
"entrusted to a coordinate branch of government,"' 125 and thereby
immune. At the same time, the court's consideration of whether
the imposition of liability might impair the exercise of the governmental function reflects the Johnson court's desire to avoid entangling the judicial branch in decisions which are to be made by
the executive and legislative branches of government. This cons'deration was sharply outlined in the Lipman holding:
There is a vital public interest in securing free and independent judgment of school trustees in dealing with personnel
problems, and trustees, being responsible for the fiscal wellbeing of their districts, would be especially sensitive to the
financial
consequences of suits for damages against the dis26
tricts.'
The difficulty with the policy factors put forth first in Lipman,
and then in Johnson, is that they do not provide a workable basis
for analysis. For example, the "importance to the public of the
function involved" is a qualitative judgment. Decisions as to priorities of public importance are made by legislatures and government executives, not courts. There may be legislative history
available to aid the court in determining the function's importance,
but if there is not, the standards by which a court would make
this determination are extremely vague.
The California Supreme Court recognized this difficulty in
the Johnson case itself. Replying to the state's contention that
the Youth Authority fulfills the "important" public service of rehabilitation of juveniles, the court noted:
In the absence of legislative declaration, we cannot say that
the Youth Authority performs a function so much more important than that of other state agencies as to warrant total
immunity. Indeed, if "importance" were the criterion, presumably most state services could meet it: immunity would
then be the rule rather than the exception,
and we would
2
truly have turned Muskopf on its head.1'
v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 359 P.2d 465, 467, 11
Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961).
125. 69 Cal. 2d at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
126. 55 Cal. 2d at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
127. 69 Cal. 2d at 798, 447 P.2d at 363-64, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52.
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Similarly, the third policy consideration which Lipman and
Johnson posit as a means of deciding which actions are discretionary-the availability of remedies other than tort suits-is not much
help. It is hard to conceive of what other "remedies" the court
had in mind. For example, if the court was referring to the question whether the plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, this would seem irrelevant to the issue of whether the governmental action was "committed to a coordinate branch of government." Furthermore, the Tort Claims Act requires that a
claim for damages be filed and rejected by the governmental entity
before suit can be brought. 2 8 The Act thus has built into it a
procedural exhaustion of remedies requirement that must be satisfied before the court will consider the substantive question of immunity. To sum up the "availability of other remedies" remains
a procedural requirement rather than part of a practicable test for
determining the question of immunity.
While the policy considerations listed in Johnson appear to
be of dubious value in aiding courts to decide the immunity question, the California Supreme Court has alluded to several other
considerations which may be more helpful. First, where there is
a specific grant of legislative power to a governmental agency to

make discretionary decisions, all actions of the agency exercising
that specific power are immune. In Johnson the court stated:
The Youth Authority unquestionably makes some decisions
falling within the "discretionary function" language of section
820.2. .

.

. As to the determination of whether to place a

youth on parole, for example, the Legislature has specifically
granted to the Youth Authority the power to weigh potential
risks and benefits and to establish standards . . . . The decision to parole thus comprises the resolution of policy considerations, entrusted by statute to a coordinate branch of
government,
that compels immunity from judicial re-examina29
tion.1
In contrast, if the Legislature has retained rather than dele-

gated the power to make certain policy decisions, the actions of
a governmental body in carrying out those legislative decisions will
not be immune.

This was the case in Ramos v. County of

Madera,3 ' where the court stated:

[T]his basic policy decision-whether or not able-bodied minors must be unemployed and willing to work as a condition to
receiving aid-has been made by the Legislature (and by
Congress). 131
128. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 905-51 (West 1966).
129. 69 Cal. 2d at 795, 447 P.2d at 361, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
130. 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
131. Id. at 694, 484 P.2d at 100, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
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Thus a court should closely scrutinize the statutory basis of the
governmental decision for clues as to which branch of government
or agency is to make the decision.
A second guide to whether actions are immune from liability
may be found in the characteristics of the governmental decision
itself. If governmental conduct or actions are identical or similar
to those which courts have examined in other contexts and with
which they are familiar and comfortable, there is some indication
that a basic policy decision is not involved. For example, in Johnson the court noted that
the very process of ascertaining whether an official determination rises to the level of insulation from judicial review
requires sensitivity to the considerations that enter into132it and
an appreciation of the court's ability to re-examine it.
The court went on to comment:
[T]his is a classic case for the imposition of tort liability.
Defendant failed to warn plaintiff of a foreseeable, latent
danger, and this failure led to plaintiff's injury from precisely
the expected source; courts encounter this type of allegation
daily and are well 13
suited
to resolve its validity under tradi3
tional tort doctrine.
Finally, a third aid is available to the courts in determining
which acts are discretionary within the meaning of section 820.21"
of the Tort Claims Act. While the court's decision on the immunity question is one of law, the governmental entity is in the best
position to inform the court and convince it that a decision should
be immune from liability. Only the state can fully detail the decision-making process that takes place in resolving policy decisions
and which is peculiarly governmental in nature. Thus it may be
said that the state has a "burden" to prove that a decision rises
to the required level, where the nature of the decision is not selfevident. The court in Johnson alluded to this burden, commenting:
Since the state fails to demonstrate a pressing interest in judicial refusal to review a parole officer's decision as to warnings, the instant case falls far short of the strong showing required by section 820.2 to justify "discretionary function" im35
munity.1
These three suggested aids to the determination of the discretionary immunity issue, while certainly not presenting a comprehensive test, at least admit of a more practical application than
132. 69 Cal. 2d at 794, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248 (emphasis
added).
133. Id. at 797, 447 P.2d at 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
134. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).

135. 69 Cal. 2d at 798, 447 P.2d at 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
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those guides put forth in Lipman and Johnson. If the discretionary immunity rationale set forth in the Johnson case is fully to be
utilized in the lower courts, a more comprehensive treatment by
the supreme court of the "policy factors" which are to determine
immunity is needed.
To conclude this discussion of the practical application of the
Johnson test for determining which actions are discretionary, and
thus immune, the court of appeal's decision in Connelly v. State
of California' should be examined. The case is of interest not
so much for its correct holding that the State Department of Water
Resources could be found negligent in imparting information as
to the projected crest level of a flooding river, but rather for Justice David's dissent. 11 7 The dissent espouses the traditional view
of the bases for discretionary immunity and can be used to highlight the changes in the approach to discretionary immunity made
by the Johnson decision. Justice David narrowly construes the
Johnson holding and criticizes the "separation of powers" rationale
found in that decision. In Connelly, plaintiff alleged that the State
Board of Water Resources was negligent in forecasting the river
height in a flood, resulting in the plaintiff's failure to set his marine
docks high enough to avoid flood damage. The court held that
the state's demurrer to the complaint should have been overruled,
stating:
[T]he determination to issue flood forecasts is a policy-making function, a discretionary activity within the scope of governmental immunity, while gathering, evaluating and disseminating flood forecast information are administrative or
ministerial
activities outside the scope of governmental im38
munity. 1
The dissent first examined the separation of powers theory
on which the Johnson rationale is based, maintaining that courts
cannot determine the existence of discretion by considering the
legislative purposes for granting immunity.1 39 Since the Legislature had given the immunity, its bases in establishing such a policy
were irrelevant. The dissent continued:
The further dicta in Johnson . . . indicating that the discre-

tionary-immunity doctrine depends upon judicial self-restraint
and abstention, based upon the separation of powers, is novel
in California law. It is not a workable tool since the enactment of section 820.2.140
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

3 Cal.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

App. 3d 744, 84 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1970).
753, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
751, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
764, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 271 (dissenting opinion of David, J.).
767, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
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Justice David then offered a serious challenge to the propriety of the judicial role in redefining "discretionary actions" in
terms of separation of powers. He noted that pre-1963 decisions,
which decided whether the employee and the government were
immune on a case-by-case factual basis, were expressly approved
by the report before the Senate when the California Tort Claims
Act was adopted. Since section 820.2 was said to restate existing
California law, the dissent reasoned:
If by such redefinition the [Johnson] court has eliminated the
the type of fact-finding discretion [found in pre-1963 cases]
it has created new liabilities contrary to Government Code
section 815, which
declares any new liability must be de141
clared by statute.
Justice David concluded that,
[s]ince the Legislature already has declared the statutory immunity of employees, and the consequent immunity of the
state where the employer's immunity exists . . .all the conclusions whether or not such immunity should exist as judicial
policy [in Johnson] were purely dicta, 14not
involved in any
2
ultimate question presented to the court.
The statement of Justice David that the California Supreme
Court in the Johnson case has created new liabilities contrary to
Government Code section 815141 is belied by two considerations.
First, the Supreme Court in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary
44
School District,1
which was handed down prior to the enactment
of the discretionary immunity statute, had rejected a mechanical
application of discretionary immunity in favor of relying on "various factors [which] furnish a means of deciding whether the
agency in a particular case should have immunity.' 4 5 The court
noted this clearly in Johnson:
The Legislature in fact specifically approved the Lipman approach in defining "discretionary" acts. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary Comment to section 820.2, part of the
1963 codification of sovereign immunity law, states, "This
section restates 4the pre-existing California law," citing Lipman, inter alia.1 0

Secondly, the California Tort Claims Act 4 7 provides direct
support for the result of the Johnson rationale that limits discretionary immunity to ensure compensation for tortious conduct.
Section 820 of the Act states:
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 773, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
Id. at 769-70, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1966).
55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
69 Cal. 2d at 789 n.4, 447 P.2d at 357 n.4, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245 nA.
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966).
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(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused148by
his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.
This section is consistent with the Johnson court's statement that
"courts should not casually decree governmental immunity."' 4 9
The Relationship Between the DiscretionaryImmunity Statute and
the Specific Immunities Granted in the California Tort Claims Act
Government Code section 820.2150 purports to codify the traditional immunity of governmental entities and employees for discretionary actions. The Legislature also included several sections
in the Tort Claims Act intended to ensure that certain acts currently viewed by the courts as deserving of immunity would remain so and not be found actionable in future judicial decisions.' 5 '
What remained unclear, however, was the application of discretionary immunity to these specific immunity statutes. Were both
those acts specifically found by the Legislature to be discretionary
and their "ministerial" implementation cloaked with immunity, or
were these latter actions subject to liability under the Johnson approach?
In dicta the supreme court discussed the issue in the 1972
decision of Baldwyn v. State, 5 ' which concerned immunity under
Government Code section 830.6'15 for an ill-conceived plan or design of a public improvement. The court first noted that the specific immunity covered those governmental deliberations involved
in deciding on a plan or design to be utilized. 54 The court then
held that the "ministerial" implementation of this discretionary decision would not be covered by the immunity of section 830.6:
The purpose of that immunity is to keep the judicial branch
from reexamining the basic planning decisions made by executive officials or approved by legislative bodies. However,
supervision of the design after it has been executed is essentially operational or ministerial. Consequently, it is consistent to find liability for negligence at that level when, as in
the instant case, the actual operation of the planning decision
is examined in the light of changed physical conditions. 155
However, when a divided court addressed the issue directly
in County of Sacramento v. Superior Court,"6 it held that the spe148. Id. § 820.

149. 69 Cal. 2d at 798, 447 P.2d at 363, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
150. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
151. Id. §§ 820.4, 820.8, 821-21.8.

152. 6 Cal. 3d 424, 429-30, 491 P.2d 1121, 1124, 99 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148
(1972).
153. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6 (West 1966).

154. 6 Cal. 3d at 429, 491 P.2d at 1124, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
155. Id. at 436 n.9, 491 P.2d at 1129 n.9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 153 n.9.
156. 8 Cal. 3d 479, 503 P.2d 1382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1972).
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cific discretionary immunities codified in the Tort Claims Act did
cover the ministerial implementation of -those decisions. An escaped prisoner killed the plaintiffs husband during a burglary attempt, and the plaintiff sued the county for negligence in allowing
the prisoner to escape. The plaintiff acknowledged that there was
immunity for discretionary acts, but contended that,
there is no immunity with respect to ministerial acts and the
alleged acts of petitioners' employees157in leaving the jail doors
unlocked were ministerial in nature.
The defendants argued that, although the escape may have been
caused by their negligence, the specific immunity granted by section 845.8(b) 5 8 must apply. The issue was framed thus: Does
section 845.8, subdivision (b),
. . . extend immunity to a governmental entity and its em-

ployees with respect to both ministerial and discretionary acts
of the employees for injury caused by an escaped prisoner? 59
The California Supreme Court answered the question in the
affirmative. The court noted that certain of the specific immunity
statutes in the California Tort Claims Act'10 had been amended
to exclude immunity with respect to ministerial acts or omissions.
For example, section 844.6101 grants public entities immunity,
with a number of exceptions, for injuries caused by a prisoner or
for injuries to a prisoner. But this section also expressly provides
that the public employees are not immune from liability for injuries caused by the employees' ministerial acts or omissions,
which are negligent or wrongful. In contrast, section 845.8,162 at
issue in the County of Sacramento case, had not been amended
in this manner:
Numerous other related sections amended at the same time

likewise provide for certain exclusions of immunity with respect to ministerial acts or omissions, and it must be assumed
that if the Legislature had intended that there be any such
exclusion of immunity with respect to section 845.8, subdivision (b), it would have so provided.' 6 3
The court also commented on the difficulty of isolating "ministerial" actions from "discretionary" ones in the particular area
of correctional programs, stating that:
Ministerial implementation of correctional programs, however, can hardly, in any consideration of the imposition of tort
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 485, 503 P.2d at 1386, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.8(b) (West Supp. 1974).
8 Cal. 3d at 481, 503 P.2d at 1383, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966).
Id. § 844.6 (West Supp. 1974).
id. § 845.8.
8 Cal. 3d at 482-83, 503 P.2d at 1384-85, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
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discretionary judgments made in
liability, be isolated from
16 4
adopting such programs.
A strong dissent objected on -two grounds to the majority's
position that the specific immunity statutes covered both discretionary acts and those acts implementing discretionary decisions
which are termed "ministerial."' 1 5 First, the dissent noted that
when the California Law Revision Commission drafted Government Code section 845.8, it accompanied its proposal with a comment which states that "'this section is a specific application of
the discretionary immunity recognized in California cases and in
Section 820.2'. ' ' 166 The dissent maintained that since the Legislature enacted the statutes as proposed by the Commission without
change, the Commission's comment on the statute must be given
substantial weight by the court. 16 7 Thus, under this reasoning,
since section 845.8 purports to cover only a discretionary decision,
any ministerial acts implementing that decision would not be immune.
Secondly, the dissent argued that its interpretation of the statute in question was further supported by the Legislative Committee's comment to section 820.2, the general discretionary immunity statute. The committee stated:
In the sections that follow [including section 845.8] several
immunities

. . .

have been reare set forth even though they
168

garded as within the discretionaryimmunity.
Once again, section 845.8 would cover only discretionary decisions
and not their ministerial implementation.
Finally, the dissent proceeded 'to analyze the factual situation
in the County of Sacramento case, in light of the reasoning employed in Johnson. Addressing itself to the Johnson directive that
the courts look to the reasons for granting immunity, 169 the dissent
stated:
The reason for recognizing an immunity referable to escaping
or escaped prisoners is to leave the administrators of jails and
prisons free and unfettered from legal criticism of . . . the

organization, program, and general direction of jails, prisons
and custodial institutions .

. .

. Defendant county, having

decided the location of the jail in question, having fixed the
degree of security for the facility, having determined the program for the inmates and having established a general policy
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 485, 503 P.2d at 1386-87, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
Id. at 486, 503 P.2d at 1387, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 489, 503 P.2d at 1389, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (emphasis added).
69 Cal. 2d at 789, 447 P.2d at 357-58, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
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for the operation of the jail in question, should 70not be subject
to judicial scrutiny of its considered judgments.
But once such judgments are reached, actions of the governmental agency to "accomplish and meet the purpose of the plan"
will not be immune, and liability can be imposed if they are negligently performed. The dissent argued:
The charges relate to the internal administration of the jail,
and they pertain to alleged failures to contain and control.
They smack of faulty implementation of a plan.' 7 '
The effect of the California Supreme Court's decision in
County of Sacramento v. Superior Court is to limit its earlier holding in Johnson. The "specific immunities" of the Tort Claims Act
will be deemed to cover both discretionary policy decisions and
also those actions taken to implement the decisions-actions which
under the Johnson analysis would be termed "ministerial" and not
immune.
While the positions of both the majority and the dissent find
logical support in the legislative history of the California Tort
Claims Act,' 72 the holding of the case at least has the distinction
of not contravening the plain meaning of the statute in questionthat there shall be no liability for injuries caused by an escaping
The decision vividly demonstrates that
or escaped prisoner.' 7
Johnson v. State of California has not completely laid to rest the
difficulties of the discretionary immunity question.
Requirement That Discretionin FactBe Exercised
It will be recalled that the Johnson court, in re-examining
the reasons for granting discretionary immunity, held that the discretion vested in governmental employees or entities must be
shown actually to have been exercised before immunity will attach. 1 74 Immunity is not granted simply because the state or its
employees could have exercised, or in the normal course of employment did exercise discretion in making decisions. This facet
of the Johnson holding settled an issue which 'had been in doubt.
The court of appeal's decision in the Johnson case itself had
stated:
170. 8 Cal. 3d at 490, .503 P.2d at 1390, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (dissenting
opinion).
171. Id. at 491, 503 P.2d at 1391, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
172. See the majority opinion's discussion at 8 Cal. 3d 482-84, 503 P.2d at
1384-85, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77. The dissent discusses the application of the
legislative history at 8 Cal. 3d at 488-89, 503 P.2d at 1388-89, 105 Cal. Rptr.
at 380-81.
173. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.8 (West Supp. 1974).
174. 69 Cal. 2d at 794-95 n.8, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.8.
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It is

. .

. possible

. . .

that the failure to inform [the plaintiff

of the boy's homicidal tendencies] was not so much the result
of a decision on the part of state officials, that is to say the
product of reasoned judgment, but that it stemmed from a
negligent failure to exercise any judgment. The result would
be the same. The discretionary immunity doctrine is designed
for the benefit of officials who exercise judgment .

. .

. (cita-

tions omitted) [Slurely mere thoughtlessness does not destroy the immunity. 17 5
The supreme court in Ramos v. County of Madera176 reiterated the Johnson requirement that the employee or entity must
show that a conscious weighing of alternatives took place. The
discretion but
court stated that "[t]he actor must not only1' have
77
also must act in the exercise of that discretion.'
The only post-Johnson cases to focus on the "exercise of discretion" requirement are Elton v. County of Orange17 and
Biggers v. Sacramento Unified School District.17 0 In Elton the
plaintiff, a dependent child, filed an action seeking damages for
beatings, scaldings, and other atrocities commited upon him by
foster parents after he was placed in their home. The county argued that the placement of the child in a foster home was a discretionary act. The court first held that the county was not immune under section 820.2, stating:
While the Orange County Probation Department performs
functions with respect to dependent children which could be
classified as involving basic policy decisions (such as recommending a child be, or not be, declared a dependent child),
and hence warrant immunity, it does not follow [that] its subsequent ministerial acts in implementing such decisions rise to
the same level. 18 0
The court ruled that the decision to place a child in a particular
home "may entail the exercise of discretion in a literal sense, but
• . . [does] not achieve the level of basic policy decisions. .. .
The court then focused on the Johnson requirement that the
exercise of discretion must be proved:
'In Johnson. . . the Supreme Court also held the public
agency must demonstrate its employee in fact consciously exercised discretion in connection with the negligent acts or
omissions charged in order to invoke the 'discretionary acts'
immunity provisions .
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

. .

.

Such a showing was not and

65 Cal. Rptr. 717, 719 n.4 (1968) (vacated).
4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971).
Id. at 692 n.7, 484 P.2d at 98 n.7, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 426 n.7.
3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970)
25 Cal. App. 3d 269, 101 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1972).
3 Cal. App. 3d at 1058, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
Id.

1975]

DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY

could not have been made by the county at the demurrer
stage and the trial court's ruling sustaining the demurrer by
reason of the immunity
provisions [in 820.2] was also errone182
ous for this reason.
The plaintiff in Biggers alleged that, as a result of the school
district's negligence in not taking adequate precautions for 'the
safety of the school grounds, he suffered injuries from a beating
at the hands of a gang of hoodlums. The trial court entered judgment after sustaining the defendant's demurrer without leave to
amend.
The court of appeal reversed, on the grounds that "[a]t the
pleading stage, determination of that issue (immunity) cannot be
made." The court went on to state:
It may very well be that the case will fall within one
of those situations where section 820.2 does not apply ....
Suppose it should develop that respondents have refused to
exercise any discretion in the matter of supervision of safety
of adolescents attending Sacramento High School-even an
abused discretion knowing that gangs of marauding hoodlums
are endangering lives; that they have just turned their backs
on the whole problem.
Would section 820.2 apply? We
83
would not so rule.
If this rule were consistently followed, most immunity cases
could not be decided at the demurrer stage. The lower courts
have had little opportunity to apply the requirement, but it has
been ignored on at least one occasion. In Susman v. County of
Los Angeles,18 1 the court sustained general demurrers to the
plaintiff's complaint that the National Guard should have been
called in by the acting Governor to put down a riot. If the requirement that the exercise of discretion must actually be proved
had been followed, the case could not have been disposed of on
demurrer.
The requirement that discretion must be proved actually to
have been exercised by the governmental employee or entity is
one of the most significant facets of the Johnson holding. As
noted above, it is based on the language of Government Code section 820.2,85 which requires that the act result from an exercise
of discretion. It is also tied, however, to the separation of powers
rationale. Only those peculiarly governmental "basic policy decisions" entrusted to a "coordinate branch of government" are immune. This type of decision is not likely to be one made casually
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 1058, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
25 Cal. App. 3d at 275-76, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
CAL. GoV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
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by a governmental employee or entity; rather it will normally be
made only after various factors are weighed.
If applied to the fullest extent, this requirement could significantly broaden the range of liability imposed on the government.
To date, however, despite the California Supreme Court's explicit
reiteration of the requirement in Ramos v. County of Madera,186

the lower California courts appear not to have recognized its importance.
The Problem Of The Discretionary Decision Performed in a
Negligent Manner

A basic policy question is involved in the decision whether
to impose liability upon public employees and entities for decisions
that are clearly discretionary in origin but which are negligently
made.

For example, the court in Elton v. County of Orange'8 '

indicated that a county welfare department's decision to recommend that a child be declared a dependent is "discretionary" as
the term is used in Government Code section 820.2.188 This decision could have been made in a negligent manner, such as, for
example, by not compiling complete information on 'the background of the child.
Current California law precludes such liability, because
under Government Code section 820.2,19 as construed in the
Johnson case, if the governmental employer or entity proves that
discretion has actually been exercised-whether negligently or
not-there will be immunity. Two noted commentators have suggested that imposing legislative liability for this type of conduct
should be considered. Professor Davis has stated,
Keeping the door open to liability for some kind of fault in
connection with the performance or nonperformance of dis-

cretionary functions is preferable to the tendency of the federal cases to immunize all discretionary power. 1 0
Professor Van Alstyne has also suggested a distinction along these
lines:
'It may be possible to distinguish between injury caused by
a deliberately conceived but nevertheless incorrect exercise of
personal judgment and discretion, and injury caused by a
carelessor negligent exercise thereof.' 9 '
186. 4 Cal. 3d at 692 n.7, 484 P.2d at 98 n.7, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 426 n.7.
187. 3 Cal App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1970).
188. Id. at 1058, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31.
189. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
190. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATMVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08 (Supp. 1970).
191. Sovereign Immunity Study, supra note 14, at 256.

1975]

DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY

The requirement in Johnson that the exercise of discretion
actually be proved is a step in this direction. One form of negligence can be total inaction-as opposed to a considered decision
not to act. Under Johnson, such non-feasance, if the result of a
total failure to even consider whether to act, is subject to liability.' 1 2 It should be noted, however, that if governmental liability
is extended so as to encompass negligent discretionary acts, the
liability of governmental entities and employees would be, for
practical purposes, co-equal to the range of liability faced by the
ordinary person.
CONCLUSION

California law has been in the forefront of the development
of a viable approach to the problem of immunity for discretionary
acts of public entities, their employees, and public officeholders.
Both the 1961 decision of Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District' 3
and the 1969 case of Johnson v. State of California are landmarks

in the field of sovereign immunity. The Johnson case, with its
emphasis on separation of powers as ,a rationale for sovereign immunity, is the most successful attempt thus far to clarify the longstanding problem of which acts are discretionary and which are
ministerial.
Certain features of -the Johnson decision, however, have not
received widespread attention in the lower courts. Johnson mandates that three policy considerations-importance of the function
involved, extent to which liability would impair the exercise of that
function, and availability of other remedies-be balanced to determine whether the governmental decision is committed to a coordinate branch of government and thus immune.' 94 To date, the
lower courts have not extensively engaged in the required analysis.
As has been pointed out above, the Johnson policy factors do not
provide a workable tool. 195 While other guidelines are available
for use by the courts, further elaboration by the supreme court
is needed in this area.
Johnson also requires that discretion in fact be exercised before there can be immunity. 96 This requirement, which is mandated by the wording of section 820.2 of the Tort Claims Aot, 19
is a sharp break with pre-Johnson cases. It is one of the most
significant requirements of the case and, if widely applied, would
result in an increase in governmental liability.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

69 Cal. 2d at 794-95 n.8, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.8.
55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
69 Cal. 2d at 789, 447 P.2d at 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
See notes 124-28 and accompanying text supra.
69 Cal. 2d at 794-95 n.8, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.8.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966).
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Finally, the supreme court in County of Sacramento v. Su-

perior Court198 limited the application of Johnson by deciding that
the immunities granted by the Tort Claims Act for specific discretionary actions extended to both the discretionary decision and its
ministerial implementation. Thus, ministerial actions in carrying
out a discretionary decision will be immune when that decision
is covered by a specific immunity of the Tort Claims Act.
Certainly there is a viable place in the American system of
law, with its emphasis on separation of powers, for a doctrine of
discretionary immunity which allows administrative bodies with
quasi-legislative powers, governmental departments, and public
officeholders to make decisions unhampered by fears of civil liability. At the same time there is a need within this system to
protect those injured by governmental actions performed in execution of those decisions on a ministerial level from the blind application of an archaic rule of immunity. Professor Davis has praised
the Johnson approach as worthy of becoming the basis for future
building of the discretionary immunity doctrine. 19 9 It remains to
be seen whether Johnson will receive widespread acceptance by
federal and other state courts.
Daniel P. Selmi
198. 8 Cal. 3d 479, 503 P.2d 1382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1972).
199. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08 (Supp. 1970).

